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Entanglement witnesses such as Bell inequalities are frequently used to prove the non-classicality
of a light source and its suitability for further tasks. By demonstrating Bell inequality violations
using classical light in common experimental arrangements, we highlight why strict locality and
efficiency conditions are not optional, particularly in security-related scenarios.
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Introduction. Experimental demonstrations of the-
oretical ideas require a reliable translation between the
mathematical objects used in the theory and a specific
setup of devices. In some instances trust may not be war-
ranted due to the unnoticed failure of some measurement
devices. In the context of quantum cryptography, a warn-
ing was raised recently: the possibility of so-called faked
states [1]. In this scenario, honest scientists are recording
real measurement outcomes, performed by devices that
seemingly work as they should. What is exploited is the
fact that a physical device, even in its presumably normal
state, may be sensitive to other degrees of freedom than
the ones that are thought to be relevant. For instance,
it is customary to encode qubits in (e.g., polarization)
states of the light field; but the field is much more than
a qubit and the “rest” may trigger a detector as well.
A parallel theoretical development, triggered by quan-
tum cryptography in conjunction with foundational stud-
ies, proposes an unexpectedly powerful solution to the
problem of trust using Bell’s inequalities [2]. These
purely statistical criteria can be checked without any
knowledge of the degree of freedom that is studied and of
the measurements that are performed — in fact, they are
even independent of quantum physics. Therefore, what-
ever physical device leads to a violation of Bell’s inequal-
ities can immediately be labeled as non-classical. This
intuition can be refined to provide device-independent
criteria for secure cryptography [3, 4], trusted random-
ness [5], entangled states [6, 7], and measurements [8].
These works, together with the parallel approach called
self-testing [9, 10], show that some quantum devices can
be certified solely from the observed statistics. There is
a warning, though: trust should be given if and only if
the violation of Bell’s inequalities is loophole-free. In the
context of Bell’s inequalities, a loophole means that the
observed statistics may in fact be due to classical com-
munication (“locality loophole”) or to shared randomness
(“detection loophole”). If a loophole is not closed, the vi-
olation of Bell’s inequalities can be produced by trivial
classical means, for instance two suitably programmed
and possibly causally connected computers.
It is widely accepted that the loopholes must be closed
if the devices are not fully characterized. Experimen-
talists, however, assume to have an a-priori knowledge
that their data are not generated by a pair of conspir-
ing computers, and may be tempted to adopt a more
relaxed stance. A warning against this complacency was
issued when an unplanned post-selection of data led to
a violation of Bell’s inequalities larger than theoretically
possible [11]. Bell experiments, in which one photon is
sent through an optical amplifier before detection [12] are
another instance where non-closed loopholes can lead to
misinterpretation of results. Here we discuss another sce-
nario: using faked-state techniques [1, 13–15], we show
a fake violation of Bell’s inequalities in the same con-
ditions in which ordinary tests with genuine entangled
states are performed, by exploiting the physics of single
photon detectors. In particular, two of our experimen-
tal demonstrations feature no post-selection in a passive-
choice scheme, and a third demonstration features active
choices, with a post-selection that keeps half of the data
(more than any Bell experiment reported to date). The
take-away message is that, when dealing with a malicious
adversary, it is necessary to close all the loopholes, even
if the measurement devices are known to the user and
seem to behave normally.
Experimental Bell test. With a typical setup
to generate entangled states we carry out polariza-
tion correlation measurements (Fig. 1). A source of
polarization-entangled photon pairs based on parametric
down-conversion [17] feeds each member of the pair to
two legitimate parties, Alice and Bob, who measure the
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FIG. 1: Testing a Bell inequality in an intercept-resend
scenario. (a) Experimental setup. Pairs of polarization-
entangled photons are generated via spontaneous parametric
down-conversion (SPDC), and sent for polarization analysis
(PA) in two conjugate linearly polarized bases on both sides
using polarizing beamsplitters (PBS), half-wave plates (λ/2)
and non-polarizing beamsplitters (BS); details are described
in Ref. [16]. An intercept-resend system (Eve) is inserted in
the fiber line that carries one of the photons. Eve consists of
a PA and faked-state generator (FSG), and generates mea-
surement results that are copied into the receiver Bob. Key
elements of the FSG are laser diodes (LD), polarization con-
trollers (PC) and attenuators (Att); see details in Ref. [15].
Detection events are recorded with time-stamp units (TU)
for later correlations. (b) From the correlations between the
measurement results, Alice and Bob can test a CHSH Bell in-
equality. With the photodetectors used for this experiment,
they obtain the same result (i.e., a violation of a Bell inequal-
ity) with and without the presence of Eve, and would conclude
that they witnessed entanglement in a pair of photons.
polarization in one of two possible bases using a beam-
splitter as a random basis choice, and polarizers followed
by avalanche single photon detectors (APDs).
The test measures photon polarization correlations be-
tween two parties in two bases,
S = EAB + EA′B + EAB′ − EA′B′ , (1)
where A,A′ and B,B′ correspond to the measurements
at Alice’s and Bob’s side respectively, and EAB is the
correlation function
E =
P (1, 1)− P (1, 0)− P (0, 1) + P (0, 0)
P (1, 1) + P (1, 0) + P (0, 1) + P (0, 0)
, (2)
where P is the probability of a joint outcome. The in-
equality [18] (CHSH-inequality) states that any classical
state will have |S| ≤ 2. Quantum mechanical states can
produce up to |S| ≤ 2√2, and the mathematical maxi-
mum value is |S| = 4. Note that this expression already
post-selects only cases where pairs of detection events
were seen on both sides — it excludes the cases where
one of the photons was lost due to inefficiencies in the
detectors, source, or transmission path.
Bell’s inequality with an eavesdropper. In be-
tween the source of entangled photons and Bob, we set
up another observer, Eve. She has a measuring apparatus
identical to Bob’s, and a “faked-state generator” (FSG),
which takes advantage of the detailed physical mecha-
nism behind APDs to manipulate their output. When
in normal operation, the arrival of a photon on an APD
creates an electron-hole pair, which gets separated by an
applied voltage and in the process creates an avalanche
resulting in a macroscopic current; when the current ex-
ceeds a certain threshold, a “click” is registered and in-
terpreted as the arrival of a photon. By sending tailored
strong pulses of light into an APD, it is possible to ma-
nipulate the output such that “clicks” appear at Eve’s
will [13, 15]: Beyond some optical power level, the de-
tector does not have time to recharge and is constantly
producing small avalanches that do not fulfill the thresh-
old condition, and can thus be blinded or saturated. At
even higher powers, the number of electron-hole pairs
produced is such that the current can exceed the thresh-
old condition set by the electronics without the need for
an avalanche. By tailoring the polarization and power of
the optical pulses sent into Bob’s apparatus, it is possible
to force him to obtain any desired measurement result.
An incoherent mixture of laser beams of two differ-
ent polarizations allows the FSG (Fig. 1(a)) to address
any of the four detectors. One of the beams is circularly
polarized (σ), thus gets distributed evenly among all de-
tectors at a blinding intensity level. The other beam is
linearly polarized in the same direction as the desired
measurement result. The beamsplitter and polarization
optics in the measurement setup will direct a larger frac-
tion of the latter beam to the targeted APD than to any
of the other APDs, driving only the targeted APD into
the faking regime and forcing a false photon detection
(see [15] for experimental details). The two parties test-
ing the inequality would be registering “clicks” at the
respective detectors and assembling joint probability dis-
tributions of the possible simultaneous results. While
Alice is measuring genuine photons, Bob is looking at a
classical pulse of light. A test of the CHSH inequality is
shown in Fig. 1(b). As this is an “intercept-resend” con-
figuration, the Bell value registered will be a reflection of
the entanglement quality of the original source. In this
case the visibility in the ± basis is around 92%, and re-
sults in a value of S = 2.381± 0.036. This is well above
the classical limit, highlights the possible breakdown of
the Ekert quantum key distribution protocol [19], and
the need for strictly fulfilling the assumptions associated
with the Bell theorem in a cryptography scenario.
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FIG. 2: Bell test with the source replaced by a twin FSG. (a)
Optical outputs of the FSG are connected to two polarization
analyzers at Alice and Bob. (b) Implementation of the twin
FSG: A pre-programmed list of correlation events is sent to
two single FSGs at random times defined by a photocounting
detector illuminated with a constant intensity. (c) Polariza-
tion analyzer with a passive choice of measurement basis, and
(d) with an active choice, where a half wave plate (λ/2) is ro-
tated by a motor according to the value of an independent
random bit generator (Rnd).
Pre-programmed Bell violation. Since we can fake
any result, there is no need for the entanglement source,
so we replace it with a pair of FSGs (Fig. 2(a)). The
polarizations expected by Alice are denoted (H,V,+,−);
those expected by Bob are rotated by 22.5◦ compared
to Alice’s and are denoted (H˜, V˜, +˜, −˜). The frequencies
pPAPB with which the FSG sends out polarization PA to
Alice and PB to Bob are programmed to be


pHH˜ pHV˜ pH+˜ pH−˜
p
VH˜
p
VV˜
pV+˜ pV−˜
p+H˜ p+V˜ p++˜ p+−˜
p−H˜ p−V˜ p−+˜ p−−˜

 =


x y x y
y x y x
x y y x
y x x y

 , (3)
where x = (1 + q)/16, y = (1− q)/16, and q varies from
−1 to +1. Such correlations lead to a CHSH violation of
S = 4q: in particular, Tsirelson’s bound [20] is recovered
for q = 1/
√
2, while the choice q = ±1 simulates the
unphysical PR box [21].
For each value of q, a sequence of bright faked-state
pairs is generated by a random number generator and the
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FIG. 3: Difference between observed correlation function S
and expected Sp in a CHSH Bell test, as a function of the
programmed value Sp = S(q) = 4q. The error bars were
assigned through propagated Poissonian counting statistics.
twin FSG (Fig. 2(b)). Pairs are sent out upon photode-
tection events of an independent illuminated photodetec-
tor, to mimic the detection times of light emitted from
the SPDC source. The experimental errors evaluated as-
suming Poisson counting statistics are on the order of
4×10−3 when averaging over about 700 thousand events
per q value (Fig. 3). Moreover, because the pulses of
light can be made bright enough to overcome any chan-
nel losses, this configuration allows faking of correlations
with efficiencies of 100%, meaning that there are no “un-
paired” events: every time Alice registers a click, so does
Bob.
The fixed nature of the analysis optics means that it
is possible for the eavesdropper to use the same degree
of freedom that is used to guide the genuine photons
to the right detector (i.e., polarization) in a malicious
way to target her control pulses. Note that, although
the random choice of measurement basis for an arriving
photon is a genuine one [22], its unchanging status results
in an attack vector. So, is the problem solved just by
having an active choice of basis?
Active basis choice. We now come to the third ex-
periment, where the measurement basis is chosen based
on a random setting causally connected to neither the
source nor the measurement apparatus. For this, we re-
place the BS by a half-wave plate that is rotated by a
motor between two positions, determined by the parity
of photodetection events from an illuminated, indepen-
dent detector (see Fig. 2(d)). The faking scheme will still
work, once intensity levels are adjusted, but the immedi-
ate consequence is a decrease in efficiency from 100% to
50%, since a basis choice not matched to the faked state
results in an absence of the detection event. Efficiency
here means number of paired detection events over total
detected events, on each side. Although this reduction is
dramatic, we are not aware of any experiment with en-
tangled photons that has demonstrated an efficiency this
high (50%) so far. A correlation matrix between the pre-
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FIG. 4: Experimentally obtained coincidences between pairs
of detection events (0 or 1) at receivers Alice and Bob for their
different measurement bases (HV or ±) as a function of differ-
ent faked-state pairs of bright pulses sent to both sides. Each
faked-state pair is made up by a combination of two pulses
for horizontal (H) , vertical (V) and ±45◦ linear polarization
(+ and −). Since bases for Alice and Bob are rotated in a
Bell test by 22.5◦, we denote the faked-state polarizations and
measurement bases on Bob’s side with a tilde. Each cell’s area
is filled proportionally to the number of coincidence events;
empty cell corresponds to 0 coincidence events, while a com-
pletely filled one corresponds to 40229 coincidences. The level
of unwanted clicks is always below 1.4% (≤ 566 coincidences).
pared faked-state pairs, and the combination of detection
events and measurement bases on both sides is shown in
Fig. 4. Tiny imperfections in reproducing programmed
coincidences (mean of unwanted clicks of 0.07%) result
from using a simplified version of the twin FSG, with a
single bright-light source per polarization [15]. Again,
this matrix demonstrates full controllability of pair cor-
relations even in an active basis choice scenario. Using
this with a randomized distribution of faked coincidences
corresponding to the Bell correlations, we obtain a value
of S = 2.7971± 0.0005 in a run with 4561 basis settings
(motor positions) and about 7.25× 106 coincidences. In
principle, all values up to |S| = 4 can be generated at
will. Thus, an active choice by itself is still not sufficient
to prevent a Bell inequality violation unless it is paired
with an efficiency high enough to avoid the need for the
fair sampling assumption.
Conclusion. The strength of Bell inequalities as en-
tanglement witnesses is their formulation independently
of the underlying physical model and measurement pro-
cesses. Once we have an operational definition of what
constitutes a measurement, such as the “click” mentioned
repeatedly, there is a prescription to determine whether
correlations between measurement results could be ex-
plained by a classical model. The results in this paper
highlight how important the underlying assumptions in
the theorem are to the interpretation of results. We have
shown that ignoring the need for active choice and causal
separation might result in an apparent violation with
100% efficiency. Introducing an active choice scenario
without consideration for the possible statistical bias is
also not sufficient, and we achieve again an apparent vio-
lation beyond what has been achieved with genuine pho-
tonic entangled states. Our experiment shows that it is
not legitimate to assume that a sampling of detection
events is fair. Both loopholes need to be closed simulta-
neously for interpreting the violation of a Bell inequality
as a refutation of local variables.
While the detector control method used in this work
could be defeated e.g. by monitoring optical power at the
analyzer entrance [15, 23], such additional monitoring is
neither a part of the Bell theorem nor of the security
proofs for quantum cryptography. Furthermore, by trad-
ing off some detection efficiency, a control method requir-
ing much less light (tens of pW) can be used [13], which
would demand close to single-photon sensitivity of the
power meter. The feasibility of implementing a counter-
measure once the method of attack is explicit, does not
detract from the conclusions, but rather highlights the
need to carefully scrutinize any assumptions that are not
part of the protocol.
We have focused here on Bell’s inequalities, but it is
evident that implementation of “self-testing” [9, 10] and
even standard entanglement witnessing [24] needs some
critical rethinking along the same lines.
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